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1 
ABSTRACT  
 
This paper examines how civil society organizations (CSOs) have taken advantage of the increased 
opportunities created by decentralization to influence the role and functions of local administrations in urban 
areas of Indonesia. The paper utilizes evidence from two cities in Central Java where policies were passed that 
expanded health insurance coverage for the poor: Semarang (pop. 1.5 million) and Pekalongan (pop. 300,000). 
The paper argues that CSOs are increasingly able to influence local policy outcomes – regardless of the 
leadership qualities among elected officials – by working politically. We describe the political context of each 
city, which varies greatly. We provide evidence of how pro-poor advocates expanded their capital by 
identifying allies, building coalitions and taking advantage of critical junctures in order to influence social 
policy. We demonstrate how developing constituent interest in public policy has helped CSOs hold government 
accountable to the poor. We present a fiscal analysis of municipal revenue and spending produced by CSO 
partners, which illustrates both the challenges of increasing allocations, as well as the outcomes in terms of 
expanded coverage of health services. In conclusion, we offer implications for development programming going 
forward. 
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ACRONYMS AND INDONESIAN TERMS 
 
APBD revenue allocated by the district government 
BAPPEDA regional planning board 
BOS school operational assistance – funds from central level for education 
BPK  National Audit Agency  
CSIAP  Civil Society Initiative Against Poverty program, implemented by the Asia Foundation 
CSO civil society organization  
DPRD Parliament (municipal or regional level)  
Golkar  ruling party under the Suharto regime (1966-1999), currently led by Aburizal Bakrie 
Jamkesda health insurance program funded by the regional level 
Jamkesmas national health insurance program funded by the central level 
Puskesmas  sub-district health centers  
MBOs  mass-based organizations  
MP member of Parliament 
musrenbang bottom-up participatory planning process led by regional government 
NC Nahdliyin Centre (NC) – “Nahdliyin” is a term used to refer to NU members 
NU Nahdlatul Ulama, a mass-based Muslim organization with an estimated membership of 
30 million Indonesians 
Partai Demokrat political party founded in 2001; President Yudhoyono’s party 
PDIP political party led by Megawati, who was President from 2001-2004 
PKS political party established in 1998, calling for a central role for Islam in public life 
PAD regional revenue  
PAN moderate Islamist political party founded by reformists such as Amien Rais, chairman 
of Muhammadiyah, in 1999 
PKB political party loosely affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
PNPM  national poverty alleviation program, administered through block grants to the sub-
district level 
PPP a moderate Islamic party active in the Soeharto era, formerly led by Suryadharma Ali, 
Minister of Religious Affairs 
Perda local regulation 
TKPKD Municipal Poverty Alleviation Team, required at municipal level by presidential decree  
 
 	  
3 
BACKGROUND 
 
Decentralization – or the devolution of authority and resources from the central to local government – has been 
one of the most popular policy experiments among governments, donors, and civil society organizations (CSOs) 
in Asia. Decentralization is meant to reduce the inefficiencies of an overly bureaucratic centralized government, 
and is seen as complementary to democratization by increasing meaningful citizen engagement with 
government. However, outcomes of decentralization have been mixed, largely due to discrepancies in the 
implementation of policies. In 2001, Indonesia enacted one of the most ambitious decentralization policies in 
the world, shifting a significant level of authority and much of the political bargaining process from the center 
to the local level. One of the most remarkable changes brought about by the devolution of authority has been 
the management of public spending, with the proportion of allocations determined by the local level rising from 
around 15% of the total State budget in 2000 to around 30% in recent years.  
 
Decentralization brought with it high hopes among advocates for women and the poor, many of whom focus on 
securing universal access to basic education and health services. More than 30 years ago, the Government of 
Indonesia established user fees for public education and health services on the grounds that the country lacked 
the fiscal capacity required to offer free services for all. Until today, cost remains the leading reason for school 
dropout and underutilization of health services by the poor. While several national laws now mandate that 
“social security programs for the poor be paid by the government,” these laws have yet to be fully 
operationalized or enforced. Since 2005, a number of schemes have introduced substantial new central-level 
funding to expand health and education coverage. However, these policies have, for the most part, undermined 
decentralization in that allocations and payment mechanisms bypass district government and reimburse service 
providers directly – in the name of “increased efficiency” and “prevention of misuse of funds.” The largest 
schemes are the School Operational Assistance (BOS) program, which provides funds to schools on a per pupil 
basis to cover operating costs, and the national health insurance program (Jamkesmas), which reimburses 
directly to public hospitals and sub-district health centers (Puskesmas) for clinical services provided to the poor. 
Both programs have dramatically expanded central-level spending for social services. In 2008, BOS accounted 
for 23% of central government spending on education and in 2010 Jamkesmas accounted for 20% of all central 
spending on health (World Bank, 2008; Seknas-FITRA and The Asia Foundation, 2010). Moreover, these 
increased levels of funding are still not sufficient to cover costs of services for Indonesia’s 76 million poor 
(World Bank 2009).  
 
The main fiscal space to further increase spending for social services is at the district level (Trisnantoro 2009), 
where local revenues are expanding rapidly due to economic growth, the introduction of new and increased 
local taxes, and the transfer of revenue collection from the province/national levels to the district. In principle, 
the proximity between local government and constituents offered by decentralization should translate into 
opportunities for citizens to advocate for funds to be used for needed services, potentially including support for 
free basic services. Yet as any policymaker knows, policy-making and budgetary allocations are a political 
process with many vested interests at stake, and in Indonesia there is strong evidence that local elites are often 
able to capture large portions of State resources through corruption and nepotism.  
 
Social scientists studying decentralization in Indonesia have provided a range of political economy explanations 
as to why local governments pursue different policy agendas. Some argue that the nature of local leadership is 
the dominant factor, with “good leaders” more likely to adopt “good policies.” For example, Von Luebke 
(2009) suggests that Indonesia’s democratization has created an incentive for executive officers to pursue 
developmental policies that are popular with voters (i.e., free education and health services), but that only 
“good” leaders who have strong political ambitions and good administrative skills can push progressive policies 
through local parliaments and ensure implementation by the bureaucracy. Rosser et al (2011) further argue that 
the nature of leadership in Indonesia is mostly fueled by a politician’s strategy for securing and retaining 
political power. They note that many local politicians come to office through close connections to predatory 
elements in the military, bureaucracy, business groups, or criminal gangs, and retain power by consolidating 
patronage networks and enriching their party machine through the capture of State resources. Rosser argues that 
it is only when elected officials are relatively autonomous of predatory interests that they have an incentive to 
pursue pro-poor policies as a way to generate popular support and bolster their chances of retaining political 
power through popularity with the electorate. 
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This paper diverges from the emphasis on local leadership as the primary driver of policy-making and argues 
that civil society organizations are increasingly skilled at influencing local policy outcomes, regardless of the 
leadership qualities among elected officials. We argue that as Indonesian CSOs take advantage of opportunities 
to access local policy-making processes, it is their ability to navigate the political landscape and “work 
politically” that primarily determines their success. By “working politically” we mean that CSOs are able to 
identify allies and opponents within and outside the government, mobilize constituencies and engage in 
coalitions for change, and use their political power to negotiate agreements with elites on resource utilization 
that promotes development. In this process, CSOs are more and more shaping how Indonesia’s State institutions 
govern at the local level. This paper presents case studies from The Asia Foundation’s Civil Society Initiative 
Against Poverty (CSIAP) program, funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The 
CSIAP program was designed in 2004 to improve district-level policies and spending to address poverty. 
Recognizing that technical assistance to improve municipal budgeting and spending had been available to local 
officials for some years, the program hypothesized that additional political incentives were needed to reallocate 
funds away from “discretionary” line items and toward the poor. The Foundation sought out non-traditional 
NGO partners, and in particular, Muslim mass-based organizations (MBOs) who wielded political heft and 
were embedded in local communities. These organizations were paired with advocacy NGOs who had technical 
budget monitoring and oversight skills, ensuring both technically and politically viable pro-poor and gender-
sensitive outcomes. In the current phase of CSIAP, programming covers 38 districts and municipalities.  
 
To illustrate the CSOs’ political approach, the Foundation chose two municipalities in Central Java that were 
deemed a success in terms of passing pro-poor legislation that led to the expansion of district-funded health 
insurance for the poor: Semarang and Pekalongan. In addition to the data collected throughout program 
implementation, our team spent two days in each city conducting ethnographic interviews of agents involved in 
policy-making from the executive, legislative, bureaucracy, NGOs, civil society, academia, and the media. The 
methodology for the inquiry was heavily based on theories of politics, political leadership, elites, agency, 
coalitions, and state institutions that are being explored by the Development Leadership Program (a multi-
stakeholder initiative, supported by the Australian Government).1 The paper first describes the political context 
of each city, which varies considerably in terms of leadership and politics. We then describe how CSOs 
expanded their political capital and utilized their agency to foster coalitions that took advantage of critical 
junctures to influence policy. We present the analysis of municipal revenue and spending produced by CSIAP 
partners, which lent credibility to their advocacy efforts and illustrates both the challenges of increasing 
allocations as well as the outcomes in terms of expanded coverage. The final part of the paper explores 
implications for development programming going forward. 
 
                                                
1	  	   The	  Developmental	  Leadership	  Program	  brings	  together	  partners	  to	  explore	  the	  critical	  role	  played	  by	  leaders,	  elites	  and	  coalitions	  
in	  the	  politics	  of	  development,	  and	  address	  the	  policy,	  strategic,	  and	  operational	  implications	  about	  ‘thinking	  and	  working	  
politically.’	  See:	  www.dlprog.org.	  See	  also	  Leftwich	  2009.	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POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
Within Indonesia’s municipalities, there is no doubt that the executive (mayor) wields the most policy-making 
power. To describe the political context of each city, we look at the leadership qualities, political party 
affiliation and interactions of policy actors that include the mayor, Parliamentarians and government 
bureaucrats as well as academics, advocacy NGOs, constituency-based organizations, and the media.  
 
Semarang: A house divided 
Semarang is located on the north coast of Central Java, and has a population of around 1.5 million. It is 
Indonesia’s fifth largest municipality and hosts one of Indonesia’s most important ports. Semarang hosts a fast-
growing, dynamic economy that includes industrial parks, factories, banks, textile manufacturing, furniture, and 
processed foods. In 2000, Sukawi Sutarip was appointed by Semarang’s Parliament to a five-year term as 
mayor.2 Sukawi was a wealthy and successful businessman, with interests in real estate, construction, and 
banking.3 He was business colleagues and friends with the head of the dominant party in Semarang’s 
Parliament, PDIP, which controlled 20 of 50 seats in the legislature. In his first year in office, Sukawi focused 
on economic development and was a widely popular mayor. He attracted private investment in hotels and malls, 
and the service sector expanded dramatically. During his first term, Sukawi issued many third-party agreements 
that enabled private sector partners to utilize public assets (land, buildings, water) for business opportunities. He 
initiated dozens of large-scale infrastructure projects, which were believed to be required for economic growth.  
In 2003, as democracy took hold in Indonesia, a number of new NGOs and civil society coalitions emerged to 
participate in promoting the country’s 2004 elections. Two coalitions were dominant in Semarang – the 
Semarang City People’s Network (Jaringan Masyarakat Kota Semarang or JarMas) and the Semarang City 
Women United (Persatuan Perempuan Kota Semarang or PPKS). Many student activists were also involved 
promoting democracy – mostly Islamic-based student group such as HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) and 
PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia). Unionized workers (though the national union Forum Serikat Buruh Indonesia) 
and street vendors (through the Forum Kaki Lima Semarang) also emerged as strong constituent bases during 
this period. In 2003, the Semarang chapter of the national NGO Pattiro was founded by several activists who 
were active in JarMas and PPKS. Pattiro Semarang has since had five directors each with varied backgrounds – 
Usman (2003-04) who was an HMI activist; Marsono (2004) who was a labor activist, Susan (2004-06) who 
was a HMI activist; Iskandar (2006-08) who was a human rights and law activist; and Hendrik (2008-present) 
who had been with PII prior to Pattiro. Under Susan’s leadership (2004-06) and with mounting public 
excitement about the national elections, Pattiro’s public profile increased significantly as they were more often 
covered by the local media, and they were increasingly able to develop networks with reformers inside 
government and Parliament (DPRD). For example, Susan was able to establish a relationship with Sudarto, a 
senior staff in the regional planning bureau (BAPPEDA), who was well placed to facilitate CSO access to 
government planning and budget allocation processes. She was skilled at getting data from lower-level 
bureaucrats in the departments of planning, health and education, and Pattiro started to uncover information that 
documented Sukawi’s questionable performance – including a lack of accountability by private businesses 
utilizing government assets through third-party agreements, and corruption in public procurement projects.4  
 
In 2005, the mayor was to be directly elected for the first time. Sukawi broke ties with the PDIP party and ran 
with a coalition of Islamic-based parties that included PKS, PAN, PKB, and PPP.5 He accepted an Islamic party 
candidate as his deputy mayor. Because four parties needed to agree on one nominee, the candidate – Mahfud 
Ali – was party-neutral. Committed to promoting Islamic party ideals, Mahfud was a professor of law, founder 
of the region’s first anti-corruption NGO (pre-dating today’s Indonesia Corruption Watch), and a devout 
Muslim and member of NU. People close to him recall that Mahfud decided to run in order to “do something 
right.” Soon after the election, mayor Sukawi gave his deputy the authority to manage social services – 
                                                
2	  	  	  During	  the	  early	  days	  of	  democracy	  (1999-­‐2004),	  legislatures	  appointed	  the	  executive	  at	  both	  the	  provincial	  and	  district	  levels.	  
3	   In	  2010,	  the	  Jakarta	  Globe	  reported	  that	  Sukawi	  was	  the	  wealthiest	  elected	  official	  in	  Java,	  with	  a	  net	  worth	  of	  over	  $6	  million.	  
4	  	  	  Two	  of	  Sukawi’s	  large-­‐scale	  infrastructure	  projects	  are	  high-­‐profile	  failures.	  A	  “modern	  fish	  market”	  built	  during	  his	  first	  term	  was	  
managed	  by	  several	  private	  sector	  companies	  but	  never	  turned	  a	  profit	  and	  is	  now	  dormant.	  Semarang	  is	  also	  home	  to	  Java’s	  most	  
costly	  bus	  terminal,	  also	  built	  in	  Sukawi’s	  first	  term,	  which	  because	  of	  poor	  location	  has	  never	  become	  operational.	  
5	  	   Some	  say	  Sukawi	  left	  PDIP	  because	  of	  friction	  with	  his	  Deputy	  Mayor,	  a	  party	  elite.	  Others	  speculate	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  running	  with	  
PDIP	  was	  too	  high.	  Sukawi	  was	  clearly	  a	  political	  opportunist	  –	  within	  a	  year	  of	  jumping	  from	  PDIP	  to	  join	  the	  Islamic	  parties,	  he	  
again	  jumped	  ship	  and	  joined	  Partai	  Demokrat	  (PD),	  the	  President’s	  party.	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presumably because he didn’t see these sectors as very strategic, and wasn’t worried about appearing “pro-
poor” to the electorate given that his political base was mostly business interests. Once given authority, 
however, Deputy Mayor Mahfud demonstrated a lack of leadership. This was compounded by a lack of 
initiative among Sukawi-appointed bureaucrats leading government departments managing social services.  
 
In his second term, Sukawi faced mounting challenges from Parliament, which was led by his former party, 
PDIP (12 seats). Other parties with seats in DPRD included Partai Demokrat (7), Golkar (6), PAN, (6), PKS (5), 
PKB (4), and PPP (2). Tensions between the executive and Parliament heightened when Sukawi was formally 
charged by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). As the corruption case went viral in the local 
media, Parliamentarians united against the mayor and DPRD became focused on controlling the executive. 
Many commented, “Parliament was no longer about party politics, but about showing the Mayor who’s boss.” 
The case against Sukawi remained high profile until 2008 when Sukawi was convicted (he has yet to be 
incarcerated).6  
 
Pekalongan: A house united 
 
Pekalongan is also located on the north coast of Central Java, a two-hour drive from Semarang. With a 
population of around 300,000, this relatively sleepy municipality is known as the “batik city.” In addition to its 
main industry of textiles, Pekalongan also hosts small industries in metalwork, housewares, and food 
processing. In 2005, the city elected a pro-reform mayor, Dr. H. M. Basyir Ahmad. Dr. Basyir spent the first 18 
years of his career as a public sector doctor, with a private practice that served the poor. He was a well-known 
public figure who provided free health services and “even gave poor patients money for transport home.” 
Alongside his medical practice, Dr. Basyir got involved in party politics (in 1987), and by 1998, he had become 
head of Pekalongan’s Golkar party. He ran for and won a seat in municipal Parliament (DPRD) in 2000, and 
became an outspoken critic of the mayor (his predecessor) for not doing more to address poverty. Basyir was a 
fan of the national block grant program called PNPM, which enabled communities to plan and manage small-
scale development programs (mostly infrastructure).7 In addition to being a Parliamentarian, Basyir was active 
in social organizations that included an Islamic education foundation (Al Irsyad Pekalongan), ICMI (a national 
Islamic think tank), PINBUK (an NGO supporting small enterprises), and IDI (the Indonesia Doctor’s 
Association). During his tenure as a Parliamentarian, friction between political parties ran high in Pekalongan. 
Twice party supporters rioted and burned public buildings, once after a conflict between the PPP and Golkar 
parties (1997), and a second time between PPP and PKB parties (1999). When Basyir ran for mayor in 2005, his 
party was ranked fourth; PPP held the most seats, followed by the PDIP, PKB, and Golkar parties. Basyir’s 
popularity and his ability to mobilize grassroots voters through his social welfare platform resulted in he and his 
running mate – H. Abu Almafachier of the PKB party – winning the election with 60% of the vote. 
 
As Dr. Basyir made his way into politics, the NGO Pattiro Pekalongan was founded in 1999 to promote 
transparency and accountability in local governance. Since its establishment, Pattiro Pekalongan has only had 
two directors, Aminuddin Aziz or Amin (who served from 1999-2009) and Sugiharto (the current director). 
Both are originally from Pekalongan, and started out as environmental activists. When Pattiro was founded, it 
was closely aligned with workers’ rights groups. The NGO quickly went about building its own constituency 
through a grassroots “Community Center” program in poor neighborhoods. Pattiro is well-known for its ability 
to facilitate bottom-up planning, and for helping poor constituents advocate for their needs to local government. 
They also train community leaders in governance, two of whom now serve in Pekalongan’s Parliament. 
 
When the charismatic Basyir took office, Pattiro was well-placed to influence him. As the mayor went about 
consulting the public to demonstrate his commitment to social welfare, he also formed a “Team of Five” to 
advise him. Members include a representative of his party (Golkar), the bureaucracy (S. Budi Santoso of 
BAPPEDA’s Planning and Evaluation Unit), the community (Anton, who led a model PNPM program), an 
academic, and Pattiro’s director, Amin. While the mayor didn’t have a personal connection to Amin or Pattiro, 
he recalls “checking out the NGOs” and finding that Pattiro was the most credible. The “Team of Five” quickly 
                                                
6	  	   President	  Yudhoyono	  has	  yet	  to	  sign	  the	  instruction	  to	  jail	  Sukawi,	  so	  he	  was	  able	  to	  complete	  his	  term	  as	  mayor,	  which	  ended	  in	  
July	  2010.	  Sukawi	  remains	  free	  until	  today,	  and	  the	  president	  has	  been	  criticized	  in	  the	  press	  for	  protecting	  him.	  
7	  	   The	  National	  Community	  Empowerment	  Program–PNPM–is	  Indonesia’s	  largest	  poverty	  alleviation	  initiative.	  It	  was	  designed	  based	  
on	  two	  World	  Bank-­‐financed	  programs	  implemented	  after	  the	  1998	  economic	  crisis:	  Kecamatan	  Development	  Project	  (KDP/PPK)	  
and	  Urban	  Poverty	  Project	  (UPP/P2KP).	  PNPM	  was	  initiated	  in	  2007	  with	  funds	  from	  the	  central	  government	  and	  various	  donors.	  In	  
2010,	  PNPM	  reached	  495	  districts,	  and	  around	  22%	  of	  the	  program’s	  funds	  were	  allocated	  from	  district-­‐level	  resources	  (APBD).	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developed a strategy to reach the poor, which was dubbed the “Acceleration Program.” The approach 
dramatically changed how government funds are allocated, managed, and accounted for, and now accounts for 
3% of the municipal budget. The program utilizes a structure similar to Indonesia’s PNPM program and gives 
authority to neighborhood associations (RW) to plan, allocate, spend, and account for block grants for 
community development. When the program was launched in 2008, many government units questioned the 
scheme given that funds would be taken from unit budgets; however in large part because the mayor commands 
loyalty from the bureaucracy and had very little political opposition, he was able to push through this new way 
of programming. Community-led forums have been established at the sub-district level (called LPM) and the 
village (kelurahan) level (called BKM), and are responsible for collecting data about the poor, engaging the 
community in planning, and managing block grants which range in value from $280 - $2,800. One important 
aspect of the program is that the amount of the allocation is known to the community beforehand, so that 
planning can be done with a budget in mind. NGO activists, journalists, and community members agree that the 
program has been both effective and politically popular. Several people noted “When $500 is allocated through 
government, only $300 reaches the community. But when $500 is allocated through the LPM and BKM, $600 
reaches the community, because inevitably community contributions are also mobilized.” As a result of the 
program, spending for poverty reduction in Pekalongan doubled between 2005 and 2010, and included 
community-identified projects such as improvements to roads, schools, health centers, and housing as well as 
funds to operationalize community health services, scholarships, and water services. 
 
Mayor Basyir clearly used the Acceleration Program to consolidate his political base. The mayor deliberately 
fostered relationships between the Golkar party and community managers of the Acceleration Program, 
recruiting party members from Acceleration, as well as getting party leaders involved in Acceleration. The 
mayor also strengthened his political base by fostering a relationship with mass-based religious organizations. 
For example, one of his showcase projects has expanded pre-school enrollment through partnerships with 
religious schools (TK Al Quran). Currently, effective political opposition to the mayor is difficult to find. 
Journalists insist the mayor is clean, and say that the 2010 local election was relatively free of “money politics.” 
While MPs from other parties at times criticize the mayor’s work, no one has yet to offer a tenable counter-
platform. The mayor is obviously a talented political player who uses his personal networks, charisma, and 
policy-making power to his political advantage. It was without surprise that in 2010, Basyir won re-election 
with 70% of the popular vote, and his party (Golkar) went from fourth-ranked to top-ranked in DPRD. Also 
unsurprisingly, Basyir is grooming his wife to be his successor; she was elected to Parliament in 2010, and is 
rising in stature in the Golkar party. 
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HOW CSOs WORKED POLITICALLY 
 
Semarang: Allies act when Executive power is weak 
 
The KPK’s corruption case against Sukawi was initially built using information provided by Pattiro, who had 
collected data from lower-level government bureaucrats and analyzed it to point out irregularities in spending. 
As the corruption case gained momentum, two Parliamentarians from the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS8) emerged as particularly outspoken critics of the mayor. These included Ari 
Purbono, who served on Commission B for Finances and Budget, and Ahmadi Sukarno, who served on 
Commission D for Social Welfare. These Parliamentarians, who describe themselves as motivated by their 
religious values and concern for the poor, thought the mayor wasn’t doing enough to address poverty. They 
found allies within Parliament, and soon legislators had made a pact to initiate at least 10 new local regulations 
annually. Pattiro took great advantage of the momentum in DPRD against the mayor, building relationships 
with Parliamentarians who wanted to introduce legislation but didn’t have the requisite technical skills. Ari and 
Ahmadi soon became trusted colleagues of Pattiro, despite their holding different political views.  
 
Pattiro also had an ally within the bureaucracy: Sudarto, the Deputy for Social Affairs of the BAPPEDA 
planning agency. Sudarto understood the fiscal aspects of pro-poor legislation and held credibility given his 
seniority and reputation for being “clean” (he recently retired after 30 years of service). Sudarto became a 
champion of the pro-poor legislation, and reportedly was the main person to convince Deputy Mayor Mahfud 
Ali that it was worth his support. The deputy mayor’s support was also bolstered by the involvement of 
Professor Rahmat, Mahfud’s successor as Dean of the Law School, in the legal drafting (Rahmat was hired by 
Pattiro as a consultant). Mahfud’s shared HMI connection with Susan from Pattiro also reportedly helped the 
deputy mayor feel comfortable joining the coalition supporting the policy.   
 
Pattiro’s technical team – which included Sudarto and Rahmat – conducted policy research and drafted 
legislation that was fed to PKS politicians and their allies in DPRD, which included Daud from PAN, and Afif 
Hendro from PDIP. Pattiro sponsored a number of public hearings on the draft legislation, enabling their 
constituents to show support. While many from the bureaucracy expressed concern that the legislation might 
add “too much burden” on the government’s finances, these arguments were lame in the face of so much 
political support. The Head of DPRD, Sriyono (PDIP), was soon convinced to support the bill, albeit perhaps 
motivated mostly by wanting to come down against Mayor Sukawi. Pattiro’s strong relationship with the media 
also benefitted their advocacy efforts, and the local media frequently covered issues related to poverty and 
gender discrimination, as well as government indifference. Within a year of Pattiro introducing the idea of a 
poverty alleviation bill, the law (Perda 4/2008 on Poverty Alleviation) had been passed. Key aspects of this 
legislation are described in Figure 1, below.  
 
Pattiro is now working with Semarang’s DPRD members on a number of Parliament-led policy initiatives to 
address fiscal management, civil service reform, and oversight of third-party agreements that give private 
businesses the authority to utilize government assets. DPRD also reports that they are working more closely 
with the National Audit Agency (BPK) to develop a standard analysis of expenditure, to increase the efficiency 
of budget allocations. Ari Purbono also spoke of how PKS’ expanding constituency has changed the party, “we 
are no longer [just] Islamic fanatics,” Ari joked, pointing to his 60,000 party members that include Chinese and 
Catholic organizations, university students, and the broader public.  
 
                                                
8	  	   PKS	  was	  established	  in	  1998,	  calling	  for	  a	  central	  role	  for	  Islam	  in	  public	  life.	  In	  2004,	  PKS	  won	  7%	  of	  the	  national	  vote,	  making	  it	  the	  
seventh-­‐largest	  party.	  PKS’	  leader	  was	  elected	  as	  Speaker	  of	  national	  People’s	  Consultative	  Assembly	  (MPR,	  2004-­‐09),	  and	  the	  party	  
became	  known	  both	  for	  its	  opposition	  to	  corruption,	  and	  its	  socially	  conservative	  campaigns	  against	  pornography	  and	  drugs.	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Figure 1 - Local Policy on Poverty Alleviation (Perda 4/2008) - Semarang 
Goals 
The municipal government has the responsibility to fulfill the following rights of the poor: 
• Food security 
• Health services 
• Education services 
• To work and do business 
• Shelter 
• Clean water and sanitation 
• A clean and health living environment 
• A sense of security and protection from threat of violence 
• Participation in social, economic, and political life 
 
Programs 
Poverty reduction will be achieved through assistance with food, health services, education services, 
shelter, skills improvement, credit, and security. 
 
Health Services 
Health services will be implemented by providing full coverage of basic health services through the 
Puskesmas system, and full coverage of outpatient and inpatient care in third class government health 
facilities. How this program will be implemented will be set forth in a mayoral decree. 
 
Pekalongan: Allies are well-placed to shape how the Executive implemented his vision 
 
In Pekalongan, as Pattiro’s Amin worked with the mayor’s Team of Five, the NGO also started broadening their 
political base by expanding their own constiuency. The majority of poor citizens in Pekalongan are NU-
identified Muslims, and hence Pattiro identified NU as a key ally. NU Pekalongan religious leaders – 
particularly Habib Lutfi Yahya, a direct descendent of Prophet Muhammad – are important endorsers of 
successful political candidates. After Pattiro identified their political importance, Amin attended NU 
Pekalongan’s annual conference, identified and fostered relationships with NU leaders, and eventually 
supported NU to found the Nahdliyin Centre (NC) in 2008.9 The Center’s stated purpose is to assist NU 
members to access education, health services, and economic opportunities, and to play an active role in solving 
community problems. Amin was appointed as one of the NC’s eight board of advisors, and by 2009 as many as 
17 of NU Pekalongan’s 47 chapters had established NC activities that focus on identifying poor residents and 
assisting them to access free health services. NC records show that they assisted an average of 60 NU members 
per month to access free health services during the period of 2008-2010. In short, NC facilitated a higher level 
of participation by poor NU members in the mayor’s Acceleration Program. 
 
In 2008, the mayor determined that his programs needed a stronger legal foundation, and he returned to the 
Team of Five for advice. It was determined that a local regulation to institutionalize the Acceleration Program 
would help the initiative be sustainable over time. The mayor’s core technical team that included Pattiro staff, 
Budi (BAPPEDA) and Anton (from PNPM), drafted the legislation and within a few months, Perda 11/2008 on 
Acceleration of Community-based FamilyWelfare (P2KSBM) had been passed by Parliament. Amin recalls that 
the longest Parliamentary debate was over how “welfare” would be defined, measured, and evaluated. Once that 
was settled, the law was passed quickly (see Figure 2). 
                                                
9	  	   “Nahdliyin”	  is	  a	  term	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  NU	  members. 
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Figure 2 - Local Policy on Poverty Alleviation (Perda 11/2008 ) - Pekalongan 
Goals 
• All poor children complete nine years of schooling 
• No citizen is illiterate 
• All housing meets minimal standards, no slums 
• Guaranteed health services for the poor 
• No malnourished children 
• All poor pregnant women have antental care and skilled delivery 
• Poor families are free of infectious disease 
• Credit expands for the poor 
• Poor people can access job skills training and job opportunities 
 
Programs 
Acceleration of improvements for poor families in: education, health, job opportunities, infrastructure, and 
environmental health. Strengthening of independent community-based governance institutions. 
 
Health Services 
Develop universal health coverage for the poor (JPKMM); Provide supplemental feeding for under-five 
children and pregnant women; Control infectious diseases; Renovate of sub-standard housing. 
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WHAT DIFFERENCE HAS THE LEGISLATION MADE TO THE POOR? 
 
The Backdrop: Understanding municipal fiscal capacity 
 
In both cities, Pattiro with support of a national technical partner, FITRA (the Indonesia Forum for Budget 
Transparency), produced the most comprehensive analysis of local allocations and spending in Indonesia to 
date. Never before had budgetary data been so widely available – particularly data about actual spending – and 
never before had a standardized tool to analyze public expenditure been used at the district level in Indonesia. 
The budget analysis, which is partially presented below, gave NGOs unprecedented technical credibility that 
they used to advocate. Spending data gave Pattiro and its allies the opportunity to understand the challenges of 
expanding funding for social services, and to offer concrete suggestions to their allies about how funds could be 
re-allocated, as well as how revenues related to spending. 
 
Being a relatively small city, Pekalongan’s municipal budget is about one-fourth the size of Semarang’s. Both 
cities have seen fluctuation in their revenue over the past four years, and both rely significantly on transfers 
from the central government, although Pekalongan more so. On average, around 66% of Semarang’s and 84% 
of Pekalongan’s municipal budget was from central-level transfers. There was no significant change in the level 
of central funds each city received from the center during the four-year period reviewed.  
 
As compared to many municipalities, Semarang’s revenue (PAD) is quite high, and comprised 21% of the 
overall municipal revenue in 2010 (valued at around $27 million).10 In contrast, only 10% of Pekalongan’s 
municipal revenue is from their PAD (valued at around $3.6 million). This means that Pekalongan is more 
constrained in terms of the funding it has full authority over to program. Similar to other large Indonesian cities, 
about half of Semarang’s PAD is from taxes while taxes only comprise one-third of Pekalongan’s revenues. 
Officials said they expect tax revenue to increase dramatically (perhaps even double) in 2011, as more types of 
taxes will be remitted directly to the municipality instead of to the center/province. In both cities, revenues from 
public hospitals are a significant portion of PAD, 13% and 25% in Semarang and Pekalongan in 2010, 
respectively.11 
 
 Figure 3. Budget Trend in Semarang12 Figure 4. Budget Trend in Pekalongan 
 
 
In terms of spending, as in the rest of Indonesia, both cities spent about half of their total budget on personnel. 
Seeing what a large portion of the overall budget goes to funding the bureaucracy has built NGO demand for 
bureaucratic and civil service reform, as civil servant salaries are the main constraint to increased funding for 
service provision. A relatively low proportion of funds is being spent on capital investment – on average only 
13% in Semarang and 20% in Pekalongan – in large part because the discretionary funds available after fixed 
costs are covered is so small. 
 
The health budget allocation in both cities increased during the four year period reviewed, and now almost 
meets the requirement of the national health law that 10% of budget allocations should be for health. This is 
relatively high compared to other districts/municipalities in Indonesia. Analyses of budgets across 41 districts/ 
                                                
10	  	   All	  budget	  values	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  based	  on	  2007	  constant	  price.	  
11	  	   Pekalongan	  started	  building	  its	  first	  public	  hospital	  in	  2007,	  which	  became	  operational	  in	  2009.	  The	  hospital’s	  profit	  accounts	  for	  
the	  jump	  in	  health	  sector	  revenue	  that	  year.	  
12	  	   The	  budgets	  for	  fiscal	  years	  2007-­‐2009	  are	  based	  on	  realization,	  while	  the	  one	  in	  2010	  is	  based	  on	  plan.	  This	  applied	  to	  all	  budget	  
data	  for	  both	  cities	  presented	  in	  this	  paper.	  
 	  
12 
municipalities during the 2007-2009 period found only 30% local governments allocated more than 10% to the 
health sector (Seknas-FITRA and The Asia Foundation, 2010). Direct health expenditures – which include 
capital investment, goods and services, and non-civil servant personnel – are also now relatively high in the two 
municipalities. With the total population of Semarang of 1.5 million and Pekalongan of 0.3 million, the direct 
health expenditure is around USD 7.50/person/year in each city. Only two other local governments (of the 41 
studied) reached this level of direct health spending in 2007-2009. 
 
 Figure 5. Proportion of Health to Total Budget13 Figure 6. Direct Health Expenditure per Capita 
 
 
Measuring increases in health insurance coverage of the poor 
 
After the passage of anti-poverty legislation, the Department of Health in both municipalities introduced district 
health insurance, which is referred to as Jamkesda. The legislation was not dependent on the leadership 
qualities within the bureaucracy; Semarang’s Health Office Director (now retired) was described as lackluster 
and void of initiative, while Pekalongan’s Health Office Director is clearly of one mindset with his reform-
minded boss. Bureaucrats in both places said they relied heavily on technical guidance for insurance provided 
by the central Ministry of Health, and benefits provided in each city are hence more or less the same, and 
equivalent to the benefits provided by the center through the nationally sponsored program - Jamkesmas.  
 
Both cities saw the rapid growth in municipal expenditure for health insurance between 2008 and 2010. 
Semarang only spent USD 0.14m in 2008 for Jamkesda (3% of the direct health expenditure), but this amount 
had increased 10-fold by 2010 (USD 1.54m or 13% of the total direct health spending). With an estimated 
26.4% poverty rate (2009), Jamkesda’s 2010 allocation in Semarang reached almost USD 4/poor person/year. 
The local government of Pekalongan spent USD 0.07m on Jamkesda in 2008 (4% of the direct health 
expenditure), and had increased the allocation to USD 0.11-0.12m by 2009-10, when health insurance 
accounted for 13-14% of the total direct health expenditure. This amounts to only a little more than USD 1/poor 
person/year in 2009 and 2010. Given the higher poverty rate in Pekalongan (33.5%), the allocation is still 
relatively small. 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of Jamkesda to Total Direct Health Spending Figure 8. Jamkesda Expenditure per Poor Person 
 
 
                                                
13	  	   There	  were	  large	  budget	  allocations	  for	  hospital	  construction	  in	  Pekalongan	  in	  2007-­‐2009	  ($1.0m	  to	  $3.6	  million/year).	  The	  budget	  
health	  data	  presented	  here	  exclude	  that	  expenditure.	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In neither city were concerns expressed about the program benefitting people who were not eligible, and in both 
places civil society was playing a strong role in keeping the program accountable.14 In Semarang, data on poor 
residents was verified by BAPPEDA through the Municipal Poverty Alleviation Team (TKPKD), of which 
Pattiro is a member. According to the municipal Office of Health, as many as 398,000 poor residents are 
covered by Semarang’s health insurance program, which reimburses for services for almost any condition, 
without a spending cap, as long as services are provided through the public hospital (third class ward) or sub-
district clinic (Puskesmas). Around 75% of the costs in 2009 were covered by the national Jamkesmas program 
while one-fourth of costs were covered by the municipal budget.15 In 2009, municipal government reimbursed 
claims for 85,557 hospital visits by people holding health insurance cards. 
 
While the expansion of health insurance coverage is reason to celebrate, this paper would not be complete 
without a word of caution to advocates of free public services. The rapid expansion of spending on health 
insurance is already straining local budgets, and if not controlled, ballooning health costs could significantly 
strain local budgets within a few years.16 Currently, this risk is actually higher in Semarang than in Pekalongan. 
First, the Jamkesda allocation already utilizes about 13-14% of the total direct health expenditure in Semarang, 
while in Pekalongan it only reached about 6% of the direct health expenditure. Second, Pekalongan introduced 
a cap of Rp. 2 million (about USD 222) per medical visit to control costs,17 while Semarang does not apply 
similar restrictions. Nonetheless, both municipal governments underestimated the actual cost of the scheme. 
Based on the Semarang’s Municipal Health Office data, the actual reimbursement of Jamkesda in 2009 and 
2010 were around 1.4 times greater than the planned budget. In Pekalongan, the budget plan for Jamkesda in 
2009 was only USD 57,000, which by the end of the year was only sufficient to cover about 45% of actual 
claims. 
 
Because the health insurance scheme is virtually unlimited in what types of services it will cover – as long as 
they are provided by Puskesmas or third-class public hospitals – unprecedented numbers of poor beneficiaries 
are seeking care for a broad range of ailments. In a country that is still struggling to meet its MDG targets for 
maternal and child mortality – and where only 60% of maternal deliveries are assisted by a medical provider – a 
public health perspective would question whether scarce resources should be spent on reimbursing for the 
expensive treatments people told us were being covered by Jamkesda, such as dialysis and heart surgery. 
Resources are most definitely being pulled toward curative services, with very little attention to whether 
prevention would be a more cost-effective investment.  
 
                                                
14	   Studies	  of	  utilization	  of	  government-­‐provided	  health	  insurance	  conducted	  in	  2006/07	  found	  that	  members	  of	  middle	  and	  upper	  
quintiles	  were	  benefitting	  from	  Jamkesmas	  coverage,	  i.e.,	  the	  program	  was	  not	  well-­‐targeted.	  This	  seems	  to	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  
concern	  in	  Semarang	  and	  Pekalongan,	  which	  in	  itself	  is	  an	  extraordinary	  accomplishment.	  
15	  	   In	  2010,	  Jamkesmas	  reimbursements	  to	  Semarang	  from	  the	  central	  government	  totaled	  Rp	  68	  billion	  (USD	  7.5	  million),	  while	  
Pekalongan	  received	  Rp	  12	  billion	  (USD	  1.33	  million).	  
16	  	   There	  is	  emerging	  evidence	  that	  the	  first	  and	  most	  well-­‐known	  case	  of	  district	  health	  insurance	  introduced	  in	  Indonesia,	  in	  
Jembrana,	  Bali,	  has	  in	  fact	  swelled	  so	  much	  that	  the	  district	  is	  running	  a	  deficit	  after	  the	  program	  being	  operational	  for	  six	  years.	  
See	  for	  example	  AyuIndrayathi,	  2010.	  
17	  	   The	  IDR	  2,000,000	  cap	  is	  highly	  unpopular	  with	  civil	  society,	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  focus	  of	  future	  advocacy	  efforts. 
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ANALYSIS: CSO STRATEGIES FOR WORKING POLITICALLY  
 
Despite the very different political contexts and executive leadership in Semarang and Pekalongan, during the 
same three-year period, the NGO Pattiro was able to lead efforts that mobilized political support for the passage 
of pro-poor policies that expanded coverage of health services for the poor.18 While the political contexts were 
quite different, several themes about “what worked” in terms of working policitically emerged.  Figures 9 and 
10 (for Semarang) and Figures 11 and 12 (for Pekalongan) show how relationships between stakeholders, and 
their relative power to influence reform, changed between the time the project started and the time when 
legislation was passed. 
 
 Figure 9.  Stakeholder Map – Semarang (Before) Figure 10.  Stakeholder Map – Semarang (After) 
 
 
 Figure 11.  Stakeholder Map – Pekalongan (Before) Figure 12.  Stakeholder Map – Pekalongan (After) 
 
 
 
 
The Importance of Allies and Coalitions 
 
In both sites, Pattiro staff didn’t have much of a shared history with the government officials and 
Parliamentarians who they ended up working most closely with. They recall mapping agents and political 
positions at the start, and deliberately seeking alliances with reformers within the bureaucracy, Parliament and 
mayoral circle. 
 
In both places, a BAPPEDA planning official championed legislation within the bureaucracy, which was among 
the most resistant to change in both places. In Semarang, the champion was an about-to-retire BAPPEDA 
official who “wanted to do something good” for his people, and in Pekalongan it was a young, up-and-coming 
reform-minded BAPPEDA officer who was highly motivated to advance through the bureaucracy.  
 
In Semarang, where the mayor was aligned with predatory interest groups, Pattiro took advantage of 
Parliament’s interest and initiative, and found allies in the two PKS Parliamentarians who were elected on 
platforms of serving the poor. In Semarang, support from the deputy mayor was also important, and despite the 
                                                
18	  	   Pattiro	  chapters	  in	  Pekalongan	  and	  Semarang	  are	  affiliated,	  but	  organizationally	  independent	  of	  one	  another.	  There	  is	  a	  fair	  level	  of	  
communication	  between	  the	  two.	  
 	  
15 
Deputy Mayor’s initial reluctance to lead, two Pattiro allies who were in Mahfud’s inner circle (Sudarto and 
Rahmat) persuaded him to take a stand. In Pekalongan, where the mayoral leadership was already pro-reform 
and politically dominant, the mayor was the driving force behind the legislation and the bureaucracy has been 
responsive as a result. Pattiro’s being on the inside of the mayor’s advisors gave them the opportunity to make 
sure the legislation was responsive to their constituent interests. 
 
In both cities, coalitions with other civil society constituent organizations built the public demand for policy 
change, and helped hold the government accountable for implementation once the legislation was passed. 
Coalitions of civil society organizations came together with Pattiro to compile and analyze data about APBD 
allocation and spending. For the first time, CSO coalitions had hard data which they could use to build a 
common understanding with policy makers about the challenges and opportunities of fiscal management. 
Budget data was broadly used to support advocacy efforts in both places, being presented and discussed in 
public forums as well as utilized to suggest specific policy changes to champions in government and 
Parliament. In Semarang, the civil society coalition included unions and women’s groups, while in Pekalongan 
it included primarily NU as well as unions.19 In both cities, Pattiro created direct constituencies with poor 
communities. In Pekalongan, this constituency base (Community Centers) – coupled with the constituency base 
of Pattiro’s partner, NU (through the Nahdliyin Centre) – played an important role in managing and allocating 
poverty reduction resources offered through the Acceleration Program. In both cities, NGOs also played an 
important role in properly enumerating the poor, and ensuring that all eligible individuals were covered with a 
government insurance card that offered them access to free health services.  
 
Finally, the media was an important partner in both cities, utilized by Pattiro to gain access to information, as 
well as to disseminate information to the public that mobilized support for pro-poor policies.  
 
Promoting Effective Interactions 
 
In both cities, Pattiro utilized both formal and informal channels to build relationships, foster trust, and gain 
entre’ to policy-making processes. In both cities, some formal mechanisms such as the government’s 
community-based planning cycle (musrenbang), Mayor Basyir’s “Team of Five,” and Semarang’s Municipal 
Poverty Alleviation Coordination Team (TKPKD) offered official ways for civil society leaders to get 
substantively involved in policy-making. Activities funded by The Asia Foundation, such as working group 
meetings and public hearings, also provided official forums for interaction and exchange.  
 
Almost all individuals cited how important informal, one-on-one meetings between key agents were. For 
example, in Pekalongan, Amin (Pattiro) and Budi (BAPPEDA) said their relationship was helped along because 
Pattiro’s office was close by Budi’s house, enabling them to meet frequently after government work hours.  
 
Taking Advantage of Critical Junctures 
 
In 2004, the backdrop of the 2004 national elections alongside the Decentralization Law starting to take effect 
meant that there was nationwide momentum for civil society involvement in reform. Donors were also involved 
on a large scale and enabled many civil society programs; for example, funds from The Asia Foundation were 
used in the founding of both Pattiro Semarang and Pattiro Pekalongan (prior to the start of the CSIAP program). 
Similarly, in 2005 the introduction of the Jamkesmas national health insurance program by the Ministry of 
Health resulted in a model for health services for the poor that was taken up by municipal governments in 
2007/08. Other critical junctures were localized and specific to the municipality; the main point here is that civil 
society was able to take advantage of these opportunities in time, and use them to the advantage of their cause. 
 
Critical Junctures - Semarang  
 
• In Semarang, Sukawi’s jump from mayoral bid running with Islamic parties resulted in Mahfud Ali as 
deputy mayor. While not himself a champion, the deputy mayor was relatively reform-minded and his 
support – once secured through Pattiro allies – was needed to pass the legislation. 
 
                                                
19	  For	  example,	  the	  NC	  had	  a	  working	  group	  dedicated	  to	  monitoring	  the	  allocations	  and	  spending	  of	  the	  Acceleration	  Program.	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• When Sukawi was charged with corruption, the tension between DPRD members and the mayor fueled 
commitment in Parliament to pass legislation. The corruption charges also put Sukawi on the defensive in 
the media, and eroded popular opinion of the mayor, enabling the civil society push for pro-poor legislation. 
 
• In 2005, the creation of the Municipal Poverty Alleviation Coordination Team (TKPKD) through national 
mandate enabled NGOs and CSOs to participate in collecting data about poor people, coordinating policy 
and programs for poverty alleviation. This type of mechanism would probably not have emerged from the 
local government on its own. 
 
Critical Junctures - Pekalongan 
 
• In 2005, Mayor Basyir’s election and creation of the “Team of Five” brought together Pattiro with a 
BAPPEDA official and an individual who had experience managing the PNPM block grant program, and 
resulted in a “meeting of the minds.” These thinkers were given space to create a “paradigm shift” in how 
municipal government does business. 
 
• The Asia Foundation’s mandate for budget advocacy NGOs to work with Islamic mass-based organizations 
through CSIAP motivated Pattiro to engage NU, which they recognized had significant political power in 
the city. Both Pattiro and NU acknowledge that without this collaboration, NU may not have gotten 
involved in the mayor’s Acceleration Program, and the NC may never have been founded. 
 
 	  
17 
CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING 
 
• While many analysts of public expenditure suggest that eliminating user fees for basic services is mostly a 
matter of improved management of revenues and spending, these case studies suggest that technical 
solutions must be coupled with political positioning and lobbying by allies of reform, from outside and 
within government and the legislature. Civil society organizations in Indonesia are increasingly 
sophisticated political players who can partner with development programs to identify and mobilize 
coalitions for reform. These case studies demonstrate that CSOs can “work politically” while remaining 
relatively politically neutral. 
 
• Supporting non-State actors to conduct political-economy analysis, and to strategically utilize this 
information to expand their political capital, is an effective development investment. These cases show that 
a relatively small number of “champions” across civil society, the executive, the bureaucracy, and 
Parliament were able to utilize their agency to garner broader political support for reform by offering a 
range of incentives to politicians. When powerful agents were more oriented toward political patronage – as 
in the case of Mayor Sukawi – civil society could resort to punitive action (such as reporting violations to 
the Corruption Eradication Commission) alongside providing political incentives (such as mobilizing 
Parliamentarians against the mayor). When powerful agents are oriented toward reform – as in the case of 
Mayor Basyir – civil society effectively positioned themselves as political insiders, and significantly 
influenced how policy and spending were designed. 
 
• Strengthening the linkages between constituents and policymakers can also be an effective policy advocacy 
strategy. This can be facilitated directly by CSOs (such as through Community Centers organized directly 
by Pattiro) or through coalitions (by bringing on board MBOs like NU which already have members in the 
target population). Indonesia is still a young democracy, and based on broadly accepted information from 
the most-recent local elections – which were rife with vote-buying – citizens still need opportunities to learn 
how to exercise their constituency and hold politicians accountable for delivering services. 
 
• These case studies imply that the design of development assistance, which aims to influence public policy, 
should be based on a well-designed mapping of the politics of governance, as well as the capacity of civil 
society. Critical junctures should also be anticipated – for example, the timing of the next local election. In 
some cases, interests will be so entrenched and constituency so weak that investments have a small chance 
of producing real results, and project outcomes might need to be revised accordingly.  
 
• Finally, looking forward, several areas of additional need can be suggested. Documentation of “what 
works” in districts and municipalities where “good policy” has been passed (and conversely, documentation 
of what didn’t work in places where government has done little) will be important for spreading innovation 
and helping CSOs understand techniques for mobilizing allies and coalitions. The development of analytical 
tools that support political economy analysis, and technical assistance to local NGOs/CSOs/MBOs in how 
to use them, is needed to enable local actors to “think outside the box” in developing their strategy. Funding 
NGOs that promote transparency and accountability, counter-corruption, and good governance should 
underpin any efforts to influence social policies at the local level, given that a main barrier is often 
politicians who are held hostage by special interests and patronage networks.  
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